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On 17 October 2007, the new maritime strategy, jointly drafted by the U.S. Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, was formally introduced at the United States 
Naval War College in Rhode Island. The U.S. Department of Defense website 
published the full text simultaneously. This important strategic report is titled 
“21st Century Sea Power Cooperation Strategy” [A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower]. This is the fi rst time in history that the three joint forces 
have formulated a unifi ed maritime strategy. This strategy report represents the 
fi rst major revision of U.S. maritime strategy in over twenty years. The 1986 
U.S. maritime strategy was developed in the latter part of the Cold War, and was 
a strategy of “war at the core,” for the purpose of establishing maritime hege-
mony for the global fi ght against the Soviet navy. Obviously, with the breakup 
of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Soviet navy, the “1986 Edition” of the 
U.S. maritime strategy has become obsolete. U.S. Navy theoretical circles were 
faced with the new situation of international antiterrorism and the rapid rise 
of emerging countries and the formation of an international multipolar world, 
in the face of various kinds of traditional security and nontraditional security 
threats after the “9/11” incident, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. 
After more than two years of debate and discussion, the new maritime strategy 
was introduced under the great banner of “cooperation.” 
The report contains a total of sixteen pages, divided into fi ve parts: Introduc-
tion, Challenges of a New Era, Maritime Strategic Principles, Implementing the 
Strategy, and Conclusion. In the introduction, the new strategy puts forward 
its central viewpoint: that coordination and cooperation must be strengthened 
among the maritime forces of each military service and each domestic depart-
ment, [as well as among] all international allies. Mutual confi dence and trust 
must [likewise] be fostered to [further common interests in] answer[ing] com-
mon threats. For a prosperous future, sea power must be a unifi ed force. An-
other important point is that preventing wars and winning wars are equally 
important. The new strategy holds that naval forces should be committed to 
decisively win the war, but at the same time it is also necessary to enhance 
the capacity to prevent war [from occurring]. The report emphasizes that 
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preventing war has been elevated to the same [level of] importance as winning 
war. This is a major bright spot of the strategy.
In the section on Challenges of a New Era, the new strategy systematically 
analyzes each potential threat facing the United States, including the continu-
ous growth of transnational actors, and the proliferation of weapons technology 
and information, [as well as of] natural disasters, etc. The new strategy believes 
that the future is full of uncertainties, particularly [with] the vast majority of 
the world’s population living in areas within several hundred kilometers of the 
ocean, which requires a whole new way of thinking about the role of sea power. 
It stressed that no country alone has adequate resources to ensure the security 
of the entire maritime area. The strategy therefore calls upon each nation’s gov-
ernment, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the 
private sector to develop partnerships [based on] common interests to deal with 
the new threats constantly emerging. 
In its section on Maritime Strategic Principles, the new strategy puts for-
ward [the following]: In order to fulfi ll the United States’ commitments to the 
security and stability of its allies, U.S. maritime forces will be concentrated and 
forward deployed in order to restrict the area of confl ict, [and thereby] prevent 
large-scale war. In the future, U.S. maritime forces will focus on areas in which 
there is tension or in which the United States is required to fulfi ll commitments 
to its allies. The United States will continue to deploy powerful combat forces 
in the western Pacifi c, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean in order to pro-
tect the interests of the United States and its allies and contain potential com-
petitors. But in the new environment, the United States is facing a variety of 
threats around the world; it should therefore make full use of the expeditionary 
and multirole uses of maritime power and globally distribute forces in a task-
oriented manner in order to defend the homeland and U.S. citizens and pro-
mote U.S. national interests around the world. The report consequently puts 
forward six strategic missions at the regional and global level: make use of for-
ward deployment, limit regional confl ict with decisive maritime power, prevent 
war between great powers, win wars, expand the degree of depth for national 
homeland defense, and develop and preserve a cooperative system with even 
more allies; it is necessary to prevent and contain the damage and instability in 
some areas to prevent endangering the stability of the global system. 
The section on the Implementation of the Strategy puts forward six major 
missions for maritime power, including forward deployment, deterrence, sea 
control, force delivery, maritime security and humanitarian assistance, etc. The 
new strategy calls for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to jointly 
expand their core capabilities of maritime power. In order to increase its oper-
ability, the new strategy explicitly requires that three aspects be regarded as the 
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highest priority missions for maritime power at present: enhancing integration 
and coordinated combat capability, maritime security awareness, and personnel 
preparation.
The conclusion stresses that this strategy is issued based on a comprehensive 
assessment of the nation’s security requirements. It does not assume confl ict, 
but also recognizes the historical reality that peace cannot be automatically 
maintained. It requires building a series of core competencies from a broad, 
long-range perspective, [and] proactively seizing opportunities to protect the 
vital interests of the United States. It recognizes that in this era of rapid changes 
[the United States] face[s] uncertain factors that give rise to challenges. It points 
out, moreover, the importance in the twenty-fi rst century of U.S. naval forces 
working together with other countries to promote global security and prosper-
ity while simultaneously defending the nation’s vital national interests.
Overall, this report has the following characteristics: First, it prominently 
emphasizes maritime security cooperation. The report is entitled “[a] coopera-
tive strategy,” and its content places a great deal of emphasis on “cooperation” 
at two different levels: domestically, coordination and cooperation among each 
maritime force and maritime affairs department; and globally, cooperation 
among sea allies and partners. Second, it is the fi rst multiservice maritime strat-
egy report. This is the fi rst time that the U.S. sea services jointly issued a strate-
gic report. The report makes concrete plans for the joint operations of the three 
maritime forces. Third, [the report] attaches importance to global maritime se-
curity and partnership. The report not only stresses cooperation with allies, but 
also advocates forming partnerships with other nations that possess common 
interests in maritime affairs. Fourth, new maritime opponents. While attaching 
importance to traditional state military opponents, it also attaches tremendous 
importance to threats from nonstate actors, and stresses that the latter cause a 
series of nontraditional security [threats], [which] will determine [useful areas 
for] the maritime security cooperation. Fifth, the strategic means of diversifi ca-
tion. In maintaining maritime security means, the report stresses the combi-
nation of hard and soft power, and attaches importance to both the forward 
deployment of military forces and information gathering capacity building. It 
also emphasizes humanitarian assistance to establish a good international im-
age. Sixth, prevent the outbreak of confl icts. Although the report adheres to the 
viewpoint of winning wars, what is worth noting is that it places a great deal of 
报告与美国海军界正在酝酿的所谓 “千舰海军” 的概念有异曲同工之处.
The [maritime strategy] and the so-called “Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliber-
ated within U.S. Navy circles are two sides of the same coin. 
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emphasis on preventing the outbreak of confl ict, and specially emphasizes using 
powerful force to deter war. 
As can be seen from the report, in the face of the complex intertwining of 
current traditional threats and nontraditional threats in the international secu-
rity situation, the United States seems to have felt to some extent that its ability 
is not equal to its ambition. It therefore needs to cooperate with its allies and 
other partner countries to jointly build a stable maritime security order. The re-
port stressed that this maritime order will be benefi cial to protecting the United 
States’ own maritime interests, by working together with other countries to pro-
mote global security and prosperity. For this reason, the report and the so-called 
“Thousand Ship Navy” concept currently being deliberated within U.S. Navy 
circles are two sides of the same coin. 
On 5–6 December [2007], I attended an academic conference at the U.S. 
Naval War College, entitled “Defi ning a Maritime Security Partnership with 
China.” This is the fi rst symposium on Sino-U.S. maritime security cooperation 
held by the U.S. Navy. Conference topics included: Sino-U.S. relations and com-
mon global maritime interests, maritime awareness, maritime legal issues and 
humanitarian operations, regional security challenges, and the future of Sino-
U.S. maritime security cooperation. The conference revolved around in-depth 
discussion of these subjects; proposals for various ways for maritime security 
cooperation between the two countries were put forward, and prospects for co-
operation were optimistically forecast. In fact, the atmosphere of the confer-
ence is consistent with the new strategic report recently published by the United 
States, and refl ects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partner-
ship with China and integrate China within the maritime security order led by 
the United States.
T R A N S L AT O R ’ S  N O T E 
This article was originally published in Leaders, no. 19 (December 2007), pp. 29–30.
这 . . . 体现出美国海军方面试图将中国视为海上合作的伙伴, 将中国拉入到美国主导
的海洋安全秩序之中.
[This] refl ects the efforts of the U.S. Navy to establish a maritime partnership with China and 
integrate China within the maritime security order led by the United States.
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